It has also been stated that then, on the advice of Mansfield, ' 7 Blackstone decided to read lectures on English law, without a university appointment, to such students as were disposed to attend them at Oxford. But Blackstone indicates that he conceived of the novel plan of teaching English law in a university and despite prejudices against educational innovations was encouraged by those in the university and out of it.
5
Perhaps Mansfield was one of those out of the University who encouraged him in his private undertaking, which led to his election in 1758 as the first Vinerian professor of law at Oxford. Certainly when the professionally obscure Blackstone wished to leave the practice to become a university lecturer, Mansfield, who was politically influential, desired to aid him in achieving his ambition.
Mansfield's reactions to the published lectures of Blackstone were apparently contradictory. Blackstone stated in a letter of February, 1766, that Mansfield had done him the honor to mark out a few of the many errors in Book One which was published in 1765.'9 Mansfield, usually critical of "the authorities, ' ' 20 highly approved of the Commentaries for law students, as he said there they would find analytical reasoning diffused in a pleasing style and that he knew no other work to recommend to them.21 Yet Bentham stated in 1828 in the historical introduction to the second edition of A Fragment on Government, 2 2 a work which appeared 17 MacDonell, Blackstone, 2 Dict. Nat. Biog. (i9o8), 586; 3 Mallet, History of the Univ.
of Oxford (1928) , 127 n. 3.
18 Preface, i B1. Comm. Clitherow, supra note 3, xxix, states that Blackstone resided chiefly at Oxford from 1750 to 1756, while composing his lectures. Sharswood, supra note 7, xii, and Welsby, English Judges (1846), 333, state that Blackstone planned his lectures on English law about 1750. Since Blackstone began his lectures in 1753 he no doubt had been working on them before that year. See Douglas, supra note 3, I4; 4 Encyc. Brit. (IWth ed. 1926 ), 25; Odgers, supra note 3, 6o4; Holdsworth, Blackstone, 4 Camb. L. J. 261, 262, 271 (1932) . In the preface, however, Blackstone states that "his original plan took its rise in the year 1753. " Perhaps Mansfield and others suggested in 1753 that Blackstone read the lectures on English law which he was preparing. Foss, suptra note 7, 246; Holliday, supra note 13, 89. It is often stated that it was Mansfield who furnished Blackstone the idea of lectures on English law. Hicks, supra note 1o, 1o9; Warren, supra note 8, 178 n.; Willis, supra note 5, 155; Holdsworth, Charles Viner, 39 L. Quar. Rev. 17, 23 n. 4 (X923). 20 Roscoe, supra note 3, 248; Wallace, infra note 43, 29. 21 Holliday, supra note 13, 89, does not give the date of Mansfield's remark. Dicey, Blackstone's Commentaries, 4 Camb. L. Jour. 286, 287 (1932) , states that the remark was made about 1767. The fourth book of the Commentaries was not published until 1769. anonymously in 1776, that Mansfield was delighted by the attack on the Commentaries, an attack largely on the constitutional principles set forth in the introduction to Book One rather than on the work as a whole. 2 3 These apparently inconsistent views of Mansfield, if he held them, can be reconciled as Mansfield could recommend the work as an introductory text for the study of "municipal law," since suitable ones were not available, and still disapprove of the constitutional principles set forth in the introduction. 24 This disapprobation, if it existed, was hardly consistent with Mansfield's political philosophy. Mansfield has been considered by many as one of the leaders in the English government who fostered just prior to the Revolution reactionary foreign policies antagonistic to the American colonies. 25 In fact John Quincy Adams in 1829 charged him with being more responsible for the Revolution than any other man.21 Blackstone, while 23 Ibid., 246. The Fragment in addition to containing an examination of the subject of government as set forth in the introduction to the Commentaries also included a short preface in which was given a critique of the work at large.
"Lord Mansfield was a rank and intolerant Tory ..... He lauded the 'Fragment on Government,' not because he understood or admired the philosophy, but because it wounded Blackstone, with whom he had had a quarrel." Memoirs, io Works of Bentham 121. Bentham's early admiration for Mansfield waned, as in x828 he stated that the principles in the Fragment on Government stood in direct opposition to the biases of "the great Ultra-Tory." 3 (19o5) . 1 x Wilson, supra note 14, x59 n. 4S Wallace, supra note 43, 29, states that Mansfield, more than any other judge, commented adversely on the reporters because his system of pulling up the landmarks of the law made it necessary for him to discredit the old authorities; that he was more sympathetic with Pope than Plowden, and was too independent to pursue authorities or to compare their relative weight. For Blackstone's criticism of some reports, see i Comm. John Adams said in 1771 that the unanimity of the King's Bench from 1756, due to fear of livered an elaborate opinion s not in accord with Mansfield's views, which, it has been said, was the chief factor in reversing Mansfield and on which, it is said, his reputation as a lawyer depends even more than upon his Commentaries. 4 John Chipman Gray has said of this case that "the reputation of'Lord Mansfield as a commercial lawyer should not blind us to the fact that he was not equally great in the law of real property. For instance, his decision on the rule in Shelley's Case in Perrin v. Blake .... is now universally admitted to have been wrong." 55 The decision reveals that in the law of real property Blackstone followed the legal authorities rather than Mansfield's tendency to restate the older doctrines on the basis of equitable principles., 6 Moreover, it shows on the part of Blackstone, described by Bentham as "the weaker party," independence of judgment in a branch of law the rules of which had been long worked out. (1784) and Jones v. Smart, i T.R. 44, 49 (1785) . Douglas, supra note 3, log, states that the Commentaries "are permitted to be cited though not graced with an allocatur, even in the superior courts at Westminster." On the system of judicial licensing of reports see Hicks, supra note 5o, 102; Douglas, supra note 3, io6 n.; Jenks, supra note 59, 19o; Preface, i Burr. Rep. (1765), vii. 63 Supra note ig.
to discuss proposed changes. 6 4 In May, 1766, the manuscript of Book Two, or the first part of it, was submitted to him with the suggestion that he mark in the margin errors of the grosser kind.
6 5 From this one may infer that the academic Blackstone was not disdainful of the critical comments of the justices. Yet one would hardly expect that Mansfield, with his alleged lack of respect for the common law" could influence Blackstone, the exemplar of legal conservatism, the faithful defender and recorder of the common law, and the uncritical worshipper of legal institutions.
7 Surely in a work which was an introductory text, Blackstone would not follow legal innovations of recent origin, even though instituted by his friend and patron. As he said in Book One, a judge is sworn to maintain and expound the old law by following precedents and not to pronounce new law according to his private sentiments.
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What were the legal innovations of Mansfield, which Blackstone could incorporate into his work, if he had desired to do so? Mansfield's work, as described by Holdsworth, consisted in reducing the law merchant to a body of settled principles, in liberalizing the law of quasi-contract, and in attempting to recast the doctrine of consideration and to make the court of King's Bench a court of equity as well as a court of law. He said that being a Scotchman, Mansfield kept up his interest in Scotch law which tended to make him learned in Roman and continental law and therefore to approach the common law from the view point of a student of the broad principles of jurisprudence and not of English legal history. This led him to attempt to restate much of the common law in terms of equitable principles by reliance on foreign analogies and natural reason or justice, rather than by following precedents which were suitable for a feudal or agricultural society but ill-adapted to the needs of a commercial nation. Yet Holdsworth states that the Commentaries adopted the reasoning and results of the decisions of Lord Mansfield on commercial law, consideration, and equity. 70 He reached this conclusion after comparing the manuscript of Blackstone's lectures at Oxford, delivered before Mansfield became chief justice, with the Commentaries, which were published about nine years after Mansfield began his legal innovations. Since the treatment of these topics in the Commentaries differs from that in the earlier lectures but is in accord with the decisions of Mansfield rendered after the lectures were prepared, Holdsworth concludes that the changes were due to the influence of those decisions. VI Holdsworth states that Blackstone's treatment of equity jurisprudence in the Commentaries as contrasted to those in the earlier lectures, does little more than reproduce in a connected and literary form the views expressed by Lord Mansfield in his decisions.7 Hammond repeats a statement that the chapter on "proceedings in equity" 7 2 has been said to be the work of Lord Mansfield. 73 This statement, however, is not accepted by Hammond, who says that "the style and method seem to be the same with the rest of the book."4 Hammond summarizes his view of Mansfield's influence on Blackstone's chapter on proceedings in equity in these words: It is no doubt the object of the entire chapter to reduce all the differences between law and equity, so far as possible, to matter of mere procedure, and forward the blending of the two. Lord Mansfield was doing all he could in the courts of law to forward the same object by means of actions on the case; the equitable nature of which in the Roman sense of the term he was civilian enough to see and appreciate ..... 75 Blackstone considered the division of the English law into two systems, one of law and the other of equity; an artificial one, a separation not to be found in any other country in the universe. 6 He did not believe, as did Lord Kames 77 whose statements he was refuting, that itwas the business of a court of equity to abate the rigor and harshness of the common law nor did he believe that the common law courts were characterized by harsh and illiberal principles3 5 It was his belief that the courts of equity would not have been needed had the clerks of chancery and the common law judges been more liberal in interpreting the Statute of Westminster II by adapting the writ to the reason and equity of the suitor's case. 7 9 This attempt of Mansfield to convert courts of law into courts of equity, in part by the use of the action of assumpsit, 8° did not pass unnoticed at the time but led to many bitter attacks on him."' And Blackstone, usually considered an opponent of legal reform, appears in a new light, for Jefferson said of Mansfield's legal innovations that they were "admirably seconded by the celebrated Dr. Blackstone. 
VII
Turning from Blackstone's treatment of equity jurisprudence which it seems was a summary of Mansfield's views, consider the treatment in the Commentaries of quasi-contract and the introduction of equitable principles into law by the use of the action of money had and received. 8 8' 4 Works of Jefferson, supra note 24. 83 Mansfield by fostering the action of assumpsit introduced equitable principles into the law, liberalized legal doctrines, and encroached upon equity; acts, in large part, done through the development of the law of quasi-contract. Hohfeld, supra note 8o, 562.
Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1984 Burr. , i986 (1766 reads: "It [the action of money had and received] is a liberal action founded upon large principles of equity. The defence is any equity that will rebut the action."
any English judge ever used the action of assumpsit as an instrument of legal reform it was Mansfield, 8 4 and since he began this just prior to the publication of the Commentaries, it seems a sound inference that Blackstone's glowing tributes to this legal panacea s can be traced to Mansfield's decisions. Blackstone said of actions on the case, that where the subject matter is such as requires a determination secundum aequum et bonum the judgments of law courts are guided by the most liberal "equity" 6 and that when the suit is upon an implied contract for money received to another's use, it is almost as universally remedial as a bill in equity.
8 7 In the last chapter in Book Four, writing of the progress of the law, Blackstone commented on the liberality of sentiment, though late, which has taken possession of the courts of common law and induced them to adopt the principles of redress of our courts of equity principally by extending the remedial influence of the equitable writ of trespass on the case.
8
" These statements were published from 1765 to 1769.
Lord Mansfield said in Moses v. MacFerlan, decided in 176o,89 that the action for money had and received was an equitable one, which is very beneficial and which ought to be encouraged, and that the gist of the action is that the defendant is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money. In another case in 1762, Mansfield said that he had often observed that an action upon the case is almost equivalent to a bill in equity and that whatever appears upon the trial that takes away the equity will take away the remedy. 90 Mansfield is generally credited with formulating the modern law of quasi-contract.
9 ' Since this doctrine was borrowed from the Roman law, 9 2 84 "Finally, under the influence of Lord Mansfield, the action was so much encouraged that it became almost the universal remedy where a defendant had received money which he was 'obliged by natural justice and equity to refund.' " Ames, supra note 79, x64. 134, where this distinguished Scotsman about 1763 used the term "quasi-contract." "It must be allowed that the introduction of quasi-contract was the highest stretch of equity, and except in the Roman law it was never perfected nor intro- in the second book of the Commentaries as to the distinction between contracts implied in law and those implied in fact.
9 7 It is to be noted that Blackstone quotes almost verbatim from Moses v. MacFerlan to which he refers in the footnotes, 98 in his discussion of the action of money had and received in the third book of the Commentaries. Thus within eight years after this case was decided, which Holdsworth says summed up the law of quasi-contract and gave precision to it, its language was incorporated by Blackstone in his work. 99 While Blackstone has been considered as merely recording with praise the orthodox law, in this instance he again accepted without critical comment another of Mansfield's legal innovations.
VIII
From a consideration of Mansfield's use of the action of assumpsit,'and more particularly the count of money had and received, one turns to the incorporation of the law merchant into the common law.°° In dealing with mercantile cases Mansfield once again utilized the action of assumpsit and the principle of judicial freedom of decision to accomplish his purpose.-°7 Pollock has said:
When the action.of Assumpsit had enlarged not only procedure but ideas, mercantile causes could be brought before the court on the footing, not that the parties were persons subject to the law merchant, but that they had agreed to be bound by the 97 Keeuer, Quasi-Contracts (i893), 7-8; 2 Bl. Comm. *443. Ioo Scrutton, supra note 93, 14. 10, Andrews, Jurisprudence and Legal Institutions (913), 352, 359, reads, "It is under the action of assumpsit that the modem law merchant has been incorporated into the common law ..... Lord Mansfield treating the action of assumpsit as we have just seen as an equitable action, freely and without concealment drew from the rich storehouse of the civil law for his principles of equity and justice, and it may be as plainly and truthfully stated that by this invocation of the civil law as it had developed in Europe at his time, he transformed the crude code of the common law into something like the elegance of a modern system." The relation between the law merchant and assumpsit is discussed in i Spence, Equity jurisdiction (1846), *247. Courts of law in cases involving commercial and maritime law adopt the most enlarged and liberal principles and proceed upon the same doctrines as courts of equity. 1 Story, supra note 77, 31. See also Ewart, The Law Merchant, 3 Col. L. Rev. 135, 149 (7903) . custom of merchants. In this sense it could be said in the seventeenth, century that the law merchant was part of the Common Law. Blackstone had no difficulty in adopting this statement, writing just before Mansfield's work began."°2 From this one can infer that Blackstone's treatment of the law merchant was not influenced by Mansfield's incorporation of it into the common law. But Mansfield ascended the bench in 1756, some nine years before Blackstone had completed the first book, and had already rendered his decisions in Miller v. Race 0 3 and Grant v. Vaughan, 104 leading cases in the law of bills and notes. In Luke v. Lyde, which involved a point of admiralty law, Mansfield in 1759 had said "the maritime law is not the law of a particular country, but the general law of nations.,s Unless Mansfield's work in incorporating the law merchant into the common law came after 1765, nine years after he became chief justice, it cannot be seen how Blackstone wrote just before Mansfield's work began.
Holdsworth has stated that Blackstone in his treatment of commercial law accepted the reasoning and results of Lord Mansfield and again supports this observation by comparing the manuscript of the earlier lectures with the Commentaries.°6 Hammond also points out that in the first edition of Book One, Blackstone, in speaking of the law merchant, says that the law of England leaves the causes of merchants to be tried by their own peculiar customs but that the second edition states that the law merchant is held to be a part of the law of England, which decides the causes of merchants by the general rules which obtain in all commercial countries. X07 1 Hammond, supra note 3, *273 n. Cf. I Comm. *75, where Blackstone also states that the law merchant, though a part of the common law and allowed in all commercial transactions, is used only among one set of the king's subjects. Pollock, supra note 59, 287, states that at the time Blackstone was finishing his Commentaries, the process of adopting the customs of merchants into the general law was being accomplished. Edie v. East India Co., I W. Bl. 295 (1761) , is cited to show that Mansfield held that when once a point of mercantile law was settled no particular usage should be admitted to contradict it. See Burdick, The Law Merchant, 2 Col. L. Rev. 470, 481 (1902) , where it is stated that frequently the verdicts of mercantile juries were set aside by Mansfield. See also 2 Street, supra note 68, 397; Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law (x932), 291.
Pollock has said that since Mansfield was Scotch by birth he followed the Scottish tradition of cosmopolitan jurisprudence rather than the insular learning of the Inns of Court.°s Blackstone accepted this attitude as he said: "in mercantile transactions they [the courts] follow the marine law, and argue from the usages and authorities received in all maritime countries. ' ' I°9 Later he said that in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange, and in all marine causes, the law merchant, which is a branch of the law of nations, is adhered to constantly.°0
Blackstone apparently was referring to Mansfield, when, at the end of Book Four, he spoke of the great system of marine jurisprudence, the foundations of which have been laid of late by the development of the principles of insurance law."' Since Mansfield is considered as having first formulated the principles of the law of insurance, there being but sixty reported cases before his day,' it seems fair to assume that Blackstone was referring to Mansfield when he said that learning on marine insurance has of late been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions which have now established the law in such a variety of cases that if judiciously collected they would form a complete title in a code of commercial jurisprudence." 3 And in commenting on the transfer of an order instrument by indorsement or a bearer one by delivery, he defends the right of the holder to recover from the maker, "contrary to the general rule of the common law that no chose in action is assignable," by the economic argument that assignment is the life of paper credit."
4 And in support of the right of the Blackstone, in his illustration, could easily have relied on the older doctrine that "the debt was considered to be a sufficient consideration for the subsequent promise," but instead be relied on the doctrine of "moral obligation." See 8 Holdsworth, supra note 56, 26; 2 Street, supra note 68, i43; Willis, Consideration in Anglo-American Law, 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 245, 252 (1924 It would not be strange if the Commentaries failed to record the reforms of Mansfield, for his work as chief justice of the King's Bench, which began in 1756, continued for twenty years after the Commentaries was published. And if Blackstone was an idolator of the past, an orthodox legalist, and an enemy of legal reform, 30 surely he would not have been influenced by these revolutionary decisions of Mansfield, which were not yet rendered when he began to lecture in 1753. Assuredly the legal innovations of Mansfield, a jurist who sought to develop a cosmopolitan jurisprudence based on equitable principles and foreign analogies and who was disdainful of the ancient forms and of the authorities, would not impress one of Blackstone's legal temperament nor be included in a law text a few years after their appearance. It would seem that Blackstone, a typical legal conservative, though a prot6g6 of Mansfield, would ignore these products of judicial radicalism.1 principles into the law; he was not averse to turning courts of law into courts of equity; he considered the distinction between law and equity an arbitrary one; he quoted the doctrine of Mansfield's leading case in quasicontract almost verbatim; he stated that the action of money had and received could b& used as a bill in equity; and he followed Mansfield's suggestion that consideration was merely evidentiary and that commercial agreements in writing did not require consideration.
If Blackstone's incorporation of Mansfield's innovations into an otherwise orthodox text be regarded as inconsistent, 3 2 a similar charge of inconsistency can be made against Mansfield. Mansfield defended the English colonial policy,
.33 which was a mercantilist one 3 4 and such as tended to foster a national economy.
35 While Mansfield's legal opinions were an expression of a cosmopolitan jurisprudence 36 which drew its principles from the law of nations and of marine jurisprudence, he was not influenced by the developing cosmopolitan economics which Adam Smith, the Scotchman, was to summarize in The Wealth of Nations in I776. 3 Though Mansfield dealt with the common law in a manner so as to permit it to be adjusted to shifting economic conditions1 3 1 and formulated a body of commercial jurisprudence which fostered exchange, his colonial policy partook of none of the economic liberalism of Adam Smith.139 As Mansfield's political and economic orthodoxy has been over-shadowed by his judicial liberalism; so Blackstone's adoption in the Commentaries of the former's innovations has been overshadowed by his devotion to the established order.'
